Irregular Regime Transitions and Democratization

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Abstract

Existing scholarship on irregular regime transitions is siloed, exploring the causes and consequences of coups, uprisings, and interventions in isolation of the others. This article introduces a theoretical framework that ties these various types of transitions together. It does this by investigating how the size of the coalition that brings a leader to power — the transitional coalition — combined with the presence or absence of outside influence affects the prospects for democratization. Irregular transitions involving large transitional coalitions are the most likely to result in democratic gains. The opposite is true for transitions with small coalitions. External influence can be a mixed blessing, exerting a democratizing effect in some contexts and an autocratic effect in others. Analyzing the universe of successful irregular regime transitions since 1955, we find strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings advance understanding of the major drivers and inhibitors of democratization following irregular transitions.

1   Introduction

The early 2000s witnessed sweeping political change across the globe. Within the span of two years, the United States launched regime-change operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution precipitated a shift toward inclusive democracy, while a 2006 coup d'état in Thailand did the opposite. These are all examples of what we call irregular regime transitions, or the establishment of new regimes outside the bounds of normal channels (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).[1] In the last decade and a half, there have been at least 28 attempted, plotted, or alleged coups (Powell and Thyne 2011); 106 violent and nonviolent uprisings (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013); and numerous episodes of foreign-imposed regime change (Downes and Monten 2013).

This article explores why some irregular transitions are more conductive to democracy than others. Existing scholarship offers clues, but certain challenges remain. Chief among them is the fact that the literature is balkanized. Scholars tend to treat the different variants of irregular regime transitions as islands unto themselves, examining each in isolation. There is a distinct literature for coups (Thyne and Powell 2016), one for uprisings (Colgan 2012; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013), and one for foreign interventions (Bueno De Mesquita and Downs 2006; Downes and Monten 2013). In the rare instances where scholars evaluate the relationship between democratization and multiple types of irregular regime transitions in the same study, they are typically aggregated into a single category (Miller 2012).

We chart a middle ground between these approaches, beginning with the observation that most irregular regime transitions vary along two dimensions: the size of transitional coalitions and the presence of foreign support. Transitional coalitions refer to the individuals or groups that help bring a leader to power and whose support is critical in the aftermath.[2] They can be small, as is the case with coups, or large, as with uprisings. When transitional coalitions are small, leaders reward supporters with private goods, stymieing the prospects for democracy. When they are large, leaders tend to offer public goods like political and civil rights given the challenges of providing private goods to a bigger, diverse group.

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[1]Scholars use a range of terms to describe similar events including "extralegal" (Chow and Kono 2017) and "nonconstitutional" transitions (Svolik 2009).

[2]As we explain in greater detail below, this theory builds upon selectorate theory. See Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003).

The second dimension is the presence or absence of foreign support. In general, external support undermines the provision of public goods. There are several reasons for this: foreign backing reduces a leader's need to consolidate broad-based support; foreign allies might prefer the concentration of power over democratic gains; and foreign assistance may delegitimize new regimes (Bueno De Mesquita and Downs 2006; Downes and O'Rourke 2016; Edelstein 2004). These dynamics hold regardless of whether foreign actors support an organically-derived transitional coalition or induce change themselves. We therefore expect that foreign-backed coups and other interventions to replace leaders will have autocratizing effects, whereas foreign-supported uprisings and foreign interventions to rebuild institutions will moderate the potential democratic gains associated with large indigenous transitions.

To test these propositions, we combine several datasets that together paint a comprehensive picture of irregular regime transitions across the globe from 1955 to 2008. We then compare how the main variants influence democratic gains and the probability of democratic transitions. Additional tests include an assessment of how irregular regime transitions affect the provision of other public goods and what happens when coups and uprisings transpire concurrently. These and other robustness tests provide strong support for our argument.

This article makes a number of contributions. First, it places the literature on coups, popular uprisings, and foreign intervention into conversation. Although there is value in analyzing each on its own, our approach makes it possible to examine their relative effects. Second, our argument for why some irregular regime transitions are more propitious for democracy than others advances the extensive literature on democratization from both comparative and international relations perspectives. Finally, this research has practical implications. Many states have grown increasingly autocratic in recent years; a smaller percentage has gravitated toward democracy. A recent report by Freedom House finds that in 2018, 68 countries became less free and more autocratic whereas only 50 countries became more free and more democratic (Freedom House 2019). Thus, there is a need for research to shed light on the types of transitions that serve as potential precipitants of democracy.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. We begin by describing what the existing literature says about irregular regime transitions and democratization. We then outline our theory, explaining how the size of transitional coalitions and the presence or absence of foreign involvement

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impacts the likelihood of transitions to and from democracy. Next, we articulate the research design. We then discuss our findings and robustness tests. The final section draws some conclusions and suggests avenues for future research.

2 Existing Theories of Irregular Regime Transitions

The literature on how and why countries democratize is extensive. Some of the most robust debates center on how inequality and development influence the propensity for dictatorships to fall and democracy to flourish (Boix 2003; Feng and Zak 1999; Geddes 1999; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Lipset 1959; Sanborn and Thyne 2014). Recently, scholars have focused on the second image reversed, Gourevitch's phrase for how international factors shape domestic politics (Gourevitch 1978). The role of international organizations (Pevehouse 2002), linkages to Western states (Dunning 2004; Levitsky and Way 2005), and connections with neighboring democracies (Boix 2011; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Ulfelder and Lustik 2007) all feature prominently. A related literature, and the one that is most relevant our purposes, investigates whether particular kinds of irregular regime transitions help or hurt the chances of democracy. In what follows, we discuss the three most prominent.

First are coups d'état. They are defined by three criteria: (1) the target must be the chief executive; (2) the perpetrators must be from the military or political elite and; (3) the act must be illegal (Powell and Thyne 2011, 250-252). Much of the literature focuses on why coups happen (Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014; Londregan and Poole 1990; Marcum and Brown 2014; Svolik 2015; Thyne 2010), why some regions are especially susceptible (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Harkness 2018), and the strategies leaders use to prevent them (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Powell 2012; Quinlivan 1999). Far less attention has historically been paid to what happens after coups, specifically whether they impede or advance the prospects for democracy (Marinov and Goemans 2013, 800-802).

This has changed over the last decade. Some scholars are optimistic about the capacity of coups to advance democracy (Chacha and Powell 2017; Johnson and Thyne 2018; Powell 2014; Varol 2012). Thyne and Powell (2016, 192) find that because coups are often launched in response to legitimacy crises in authoritarian regimes, "leaders have incentives to democratize quickly in order to establish

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political legitimacy and economic growth." This is consistent with earlier claims about how coups are sometimes the only reasonable means of removing entrenched autocrats (Collier 2008).[3] Others are more skeptical. Analyzing successful coups in Africa, Miller (2011) finds that these transitions rarely left democratization in their wake. A third group posits that the democratizing potential of coups is conditional (Derpanopoulos, Frantz, Geddes, and Wright 2016). Miller (2012) argues that economic development mediates the relationship. On the one hand, high levels of development in authoritarian regimes can strengthen a dictator's grip in power. But if a violent transition of some kind does occur—by way of a coup, for instance—development can foster the process of democratization. Marinov and Goemans (2013, 804-805) find that in the post-Cold War era, dependence on Western aid affects the likelihood that a coup will lead to democracy.[4]

Popular uprisings are a second prominent type of irregular regime transition. Generally speaking, they are defined by high levels of civilian participation with violent or nonviolent resistance strategies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Revolutions are one of the most commonly studied types of popular uprisings (Skocpol 1988). According to Colgan (2012, 658), revolutions seek to "[transform] the existing social, political, and economic relationships of the state by overthrowing or rejecting the principal existing institutions of society."[5]

There is an extensive literature on the causes (Gurr 1988; Huntington 1991; Skocpol 1988; Tilly 1973) and consequences (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Colgan 2013; Colgan and Weeks 2015; Walt 1992) of revolutions.[6] When it comes to the likelihood of democratization following such events, the findings are mixed. One camp is relatively pessimistic (Huntington 1991, 191-192). Colgan and Weeks (2015) posit that this is because most revolutions yield personalist dictatorships with power concentrated around the charismatic head of the movement. Others are more sanguine, positing that revolutions can have a modest effect on democratization under certain circumstances (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Tilly 2000).[7] Finally, some find that only certain types of uprisings—particularly nonviolent ones—are linked to democratic outcomes (Bethke and

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[3]Though even failed coups can be impactful (Gürsoy 2012; Thyne and Powell 2016).

[4]Miller (2016) finds that coups' positive effect on democratization more generally only holds in the post-Cold War era.

[5]See also Walt (1992, 323).

[6]In our main analysis we ignore resistance strategies, but we explore their effect in the appendix. In brief, we find that the distinction between coalition size and foreign support is more meaningful.

[7]Some contend that the mere threat of revolution can induce autocrats to democratize to preempt a costly struggle (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Boix 2003; Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 2012, 2016).

Pinckney 2019; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

A third class of irregular regime transitions is foreign intervention. This is when outside powers directly intervene in a foreign state's political process to remove a sovereign leader or an entire regime from power (Owen and Herbert 2015). Why states meddle abroad (Owen 2002; Saunders 2011; Taliaferro 2004) and whether intervention improves relations between intervener and target (Downes and O'Rourke 2016) has been the focus of numerous studies.

When it comes to intervention and democracy, early scholarship found that outside powers, especially liberal democracies, could facilitate democratization in target states (Hermann and Kegley 1998; Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999). Recent work cautions that these effect are contingent upon factors like the domestic conditions in the target and whether the intervener commits to overhauling institutions or simply replaces the leadership (Byman 2003; Downes and Monten 2013; Enterline and Greig 2008; McFaul 2007). Bueno De Mesquita and Downs (2006) go further, arguing that even democratic interveners dislike promoting democracy given the difficulties of ensuring that elected regimes will enact their desired policies.

3   A Unified Theory of Irregular Regime Transitions

As the foregoing shows, there is a substantial body of work investigating the link between irregular regime transitions and democratization. Yet, these debates mostly take place in isolation of each other. This section outlines a unified framework to tie them together. We argue that two factors, summarized in Table 1, influence the odds that democracy emerges following an irregular regime transition: the size of the transitional coalition and the involvement of foreign powers. In general, the larger the transitional coalition, the better the prospects for democracy and vice versa. Foreign involvement[8] exacerbates the autocratizing effects of small coalitions and undermines the potential democratizing effect of large ones.

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[8]We use the terms foreign-backed, foreign-supported, foreign-involvement, and foreign-aided interchangably.

Table 1: Coalition Size, Foreign Involvement, and the Odds of Democratization

	Small Coalition	**Large Coalition**
Indigenous	↓ Pr(democratization)	↑ Pr(democratization)
Foreign-Backed	Strongly ↓ Pr(democratization)	Mixed ↑ Pr(democratization)

3.1 The Size of Transitional Coalitions

Leaders who come to power through irregular regime transitions almost always do so with the help of *transitional coalitions*. These are similar in important respects to what Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 7) call winning coalitions, or the group leaders are beholden to if they wish to stay in power.[9] The main difference is that transitional coalitions refer to those groups and individuals whose support was critical to *ousting* an incumbent regime and whose continued support is necessary for consolidating power, at least in the short term. This might be civilian protesters, armed insurgents, military elites, or foreign governments.

Transitional coalitions are especially important in the immediate aftermath of an irregular regime transition. New leaders must move quickly to cement control, quell short-term threats, and prove they are worthy of their coalition's support (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Maoz 1996). Central to this enterprise is providing a mix of public and private goods to members of the transitional coalition. Public goods refer to policies that benefit broad swathes of the population, such as the protection of civil liberties, expanded social and economic opportunities, national security, and even democratization (Bueno De Mesquita and Downs 2006, 630-631). They are not targeted or limited to a specific group or people. Private goods benefit a much narrower set of individuals. They include things like tolerance, and sometimes support for, monopolies, currency manipulation, special access to coveted resources, and direct payouts (Morrow, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Smith 2008).

One question that arises from this discussion is what determines the ratio of public to private goods that newly-minted leaders will provide following an irregular transition. To answer this, it is helpful to return again to the cognate concept of winning coalitions:

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[9]See also Marcum and Brown (2014, 259).

> As the size of W [the winning coalition] increases, leaders will shift that mix away from private benefits and toward public goods. A larger winning coalition means more supporters to please, spreading out private benefits, and making public goods a more efficient way for the leader to retain the support of his support coalition Morrow et al. (2008, 393).[10]

A similar dynamic should hold for transitional coalitions. All else equal, larger transitional coalitions incentivize leaders to offer public goods whereas small coalitions incentivize private goods (Albertus and Menaldo 2014, 584). This helps explais why some transitions are more likely to produce democracy than others. Consider the dynamics of different coalitions.

Leaders coming to power as a result of large transitional coalitions confront the daunting task of placating the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of individuals who helped get them there (Albertus and Menaldo 2014, 578). Following a popular uprising, for example, the citizens who ousted the old regime are experienced, coordinated, and recognize their collective potential. Their sheer size imbues them with considerable influence (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). It also means that the provision of private goods to shore up their support is impractical. Instead, leaders will have to provide public goods like democratic expansion and the protection of civil liberties (Geddes 1999, 138). This dynamic played out during the 1986 People Power Revolution in the Philippines when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators forced Ferdinand Marcos to relinquish power. Marcos was replaced by Corazon Aquino who quickly implemented democratic reforms (Thompson 1995). Another example is the 1989 Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. In this case, roughly half a million protesters in Prague helped put an end to one-party rule. Afterwards, longtime dissident Václav Havel was sworn in as president, marking the beginning of democracy (Kuran 1991).

More recently, the impact of a large, mobilized transitional coalition was on full display in Tunisia during its transition to democracy in 2014. The sustained effort of hundreds of thousands civilians helped overthrow the entrenched, long-time dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. But even after he fled to Saudi Arabia, the coalition did not simply disband. Protests continued for months, pressing for sustained, meaningful reforms to the national government. The interim government recognized the need to placate protesters' demands to restore normalcy. Thus, "[a]fter a fitful start..., the interim government moved to reassure protesters of its sincerity regarding transition" (Murphy 2011, 303). Apparently, however, they did not move quickly enough and protests contin-

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[10]See also Lizzeri and Persico (2004).

ued. This presented a dilemma for the new government, which "was torn between the conflicting needs to generate legitimacy in the face of a public opinion which was flexing its muscles for the first time —and liking it—on the one hand, and the urgency for restoring political stability on the other" (Murphy 2011, 303). In the end, Tunisia's transition to democracy became a model for other countries.

Leaders who come to power as a result of small transitional coalitions confront different incentives. Whether we are talking about a handful of military officers or political elites, small coalitions represent a narrower, more homogeneous group. The new leadership can thus more readily shower its smaller transitional coalition with private goods. Following a coup, for example, new leaders may offer special privileges and political access to fellow plotters, increase military spending, and so forth (Geddes 1999, 123). When coalitions are small, private rewards are indeed possible and perhaps even preferable to public goods.[11]

The allure of private goods when one is propelled to power by a small coalition is evident in a number of cases, such the 1963 military overthrow of the democratically-elected Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic (Gleijeses 1978, 103-107). Even more revealing is the case of Uganda, when General Idi Amin staged a coup in 1971. What followed was a period of brazen military enrichment (Lofchie 1972). Amin recognized the need to consolidate his small coalition for his own survival. According to one report written in 1974, "Amin has repeatedly emphasised [sic] that ordinary soldiers are the real government of Uganda. He is undoubtedly more willing to listen to fellow officers who hold the key to his survival in power than to either his Cabinet ministers or civil servants" (Ravenhill 1974). And when it came to rewarding his fellow soldiers, he did so lavishly. "All members of the armed forces have benefitted [sic] in financial terms since the coup... Although the military budget was apparently somewhat reduced in 1973, the defence estimates for 1972 were 50 per cent above those of the pre-coup budget" (Ravenhill 1974). Amin's military spending was so lavish that it was even cited as a reason underlying the general economic downturn (Ravenhill 1974).

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[11]In such cases public goods might actually undermine the power of the small transitional coalition.

3.2 Foreign Involvement

The second factor affecting the prospects of democratization is the presence or absence of foreign involvement. Research suggests that interveners are rarely altruistic (O'Rourke 2018, 36). When it comes to foreign meddling, external actors typically care more about trade deals, security agreements, basing rights, and so on. Actively supporting democracy abroad might jeopardize one's capacity to reap the rewards of a leader they helped install (Bueno De Mesquita and Downs 2006). As a result, foreign interveners may actively encourage dictatorships or even corrupt elected officials who are more pliable to their interests.

Given these incentives, foreign involvement tends to exacerbate the private rewards associated with small coalitions. The influx of targeted aid and support to small transitional coalitions— as happens with foreign-backed coups, for instance—further reduces pressure to democratize or provide other public goods. The United States' covert efforts to overthrow the democratically-elected President of Chile, Salvador Allende, is a prime example (Haslam 2005; Kornbluh 2003). After years of waging a covert campaign to topple him, the U.S. eventually achieved the outcome it wanted: a coup, spearheaded by General August Pinochet. Policymakers then promised support, initially discreetly, to help him consolidate power (Kornbluh 2003, 209). U.S.-backed coups in Iran, Guatemala, the Congo, and Vietnam, followed a similar trajectory (Downes and Lilley 2010; O'Rourke 2018). The fact that the intervening state was a liberal democracy renders the promotion of authoritarianism more striking.

The dynamics of foreign involvement in cases with large transitional coalitions are more complicated. New leaders in these scenarios have two sets of interests to contend with: a sizable transitional coalition and the foreign backer. Oftentimes, the latter may have the advantage. Foreign powers interested in promoting their own interests can press for non-democracy and protect new leaders from dissatisfied supporters. While targeted economic and security assistance can also buy-off influential groups and key elites, foreign support is similarly useful in warding off domestic threats. As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010, 943) note, "leaders whose revenues are buoyed by such free resources as oil or foreign aid can more easily ameliorate revolutionary threats" and suppress popular uprisings. In other words, foreign support may effectively sever the link between leaders and large transitional coalitions, minimizing one of the primary motivators for new leaders

to embrace democracy.

Of course, there are cases in which foreign powers *want* to promote democracy, whether by throwing their support behind a popular uprising (e.g. the Orange Revolution in Ukraine) or conducting wholesale institutional reform themselves following a military intervention (e.g. the U.S. in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Japan). Even in these instances, however, they may find it difficult owing to the dynamics of legitimacy and nationalism (Edelstein 2004). In short, regimes supported by external powers risk stoking a nationalist backlash, generating instability that can harm the prospect for democratization (Downes and O'Rourke 2016, 54).

3.3 Theoretical Expectations

Table 2 outlines our expectations for specific variants of irregular regime transitions. As already intimated, coups d'état are prime examples of small transitional coalitions. Coups are specifically defined by illegal transitions of power facilitated by a narrow group of military or political elites. We can also further distinguish between *indigeneous coups*, or those that occur without foreign involvement, and *foreign-backed coups*, where elites may have an external patron providing material or logistical support. We expect indigenous coups to reduce the odds of democracy and for foreign-backed coups to reduce those odds even more.

Table 2: Irregular Transitions and the Odds of Democratization

	Small Coalition	**Large Coalition**
Indigenous	Indigenous Coups	Indigenous Uprisings
Foreign Involvement	Foreign-Backed & Foreign-Imposed Coups	Foreign-Backed Uprisings, Foreign-Imposed Regime Change

Similar to these are *foreign-imposed coups.* In contrast to foreign powers supporting local coup plotters, these entail external powers intervening directly to oust an incumbent. Unless the foreign actor engages in wholesale institutional reform, the coalition to which the new leader is beholden is exceedingly narrow. This includes a handful of self-interested foreign elites and the small number

of supporters that were empowered alongside them, whether in the military or elsewhere. As with foreign-backed coups, foreign-imposed coups should make public goods even less likely since these groups stand to gain little from political and civil liberties. Western governments forcing Reza Shah from power in Iran in 1941 and replacing him with Mohammad Reza Pahlav, his son, is one such example (Goldstone 2011, 10).

When it comes to large transitional coalitions, the most obvious kind are popular uprisings. Owing to their size, leaders that come to power on the backs of uprisings are especially likely to pursue democratization to placate supporters. As with coups, there can be both *indigenous uprisings* and *foreign-backed uprisings*. We expect democratic gains to be most likely when the movement is solely indigenous. The presence of external patrons may compromise the democratizing tendency of large coalitions by enabling new leaders to ignore their supporters, or by delegitimizing those new leaders and stoking nationalist backlash.

Foreign interventions to cultivate democracy abroad, such as the United States' actions towards Japan and West Germany after World War II, or more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, also approximate large transitional coalitions. These interventions, which are often known as cases of foreign-imposed regime change, sought to involve citizens in each state, broadening the transitional coalition beyond a small set of elites. In Japan, for instance, the Potsdam Declaration declared that occupation forces would only leave once "there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government."[12] Likewise in Iraq, the U.S. went to great lengths to involve Iraqi citizens in the political process and to make them stakeholders in the new government. Their democratic constitution, written by Iraqis, was put to a national referendum in 2005 where nearly 10 million citizens cast their votes— and over 7.5 million approved it. Leaders that come to power in this manner are largely beholden to the broad segments of the newly-empowered population, yielding a large but foreign-backed transitional coalition.

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[12]See https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html

4   Research Design

We employ a research design that evaluates how irregular regime transitions impact democratic gains and the likelihood of democratic transitions. As additional tests, we evaluate the effect of irregular transitions on the provision of a range of other public goods, as well as cases that involve uprisings and coups happening concurrently. We study these effects among 149 countries from 1955 to 2008 using a range of statistical models and methods.

4.1   Dependent Variables and Statistical Methods

When it comes to democracy after irregular transitions, we analyze two separate dependent variables. The first two capture variation in a country's regime type over time. We begin by examining changes in a country's Polity score from one year to the next (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010). The Polity Index quantifies the democratic or autocratic nature of a national government, and it ranges from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic). Our measure, however, ranges from -19 to 19 since it captures yearly change. We then run another set of analyses on a binary dependent variable that captures whether or not a country has actually made a transition to full democracy. Following previous work, this is measured by whether a state reaches a Polity score of 6 or more in a given year—a common standard for identifying consolidated democracies (Downes and Monten 2013). When a state is already democratic, or after it successfully transitions to 6 or above the Polity scale, the variable is coded as missing. Thus, this sample of cases is restricted to nondemocracies.

Although our main focus is democratization, our argument should also account for the provision, or lack thereof, of other public goods like civil and political liberties, freedom of expression, and equality and equal protection under the law. Accordingly, we test whether transitional coalitions affect these other public goods using the V-Dem project (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gjerløw, Glynn, Hicken, Krusell, Lührmann, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Olin, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Staton, Sundtröm, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig, and Ziblatt 2018).[13]

We use two different methods to analyze our dependent variables. For changes to a country's

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[13]Descriptive statistics and more information can be found in the appendix.

Polity score as well as the alternative public goods measures, we use Prais-Winsten regressions with standard errors clustered by country. These are feasible generalized least squares linear models that account for serial correlation among observations. To analyze the binary dependent variable indicating a successful democratic transition, we utilize Cox proportional hazards models. This is a form of survival analysis that estimates the likelihood of an event occurring (i.e. democratization) as a function of time-varying covariates (i.e. irregular transitions and control variables). As before, we cluster standard errors by country. For all of our dependent variables we run virtually the same, fully-specified statistical models that include covariates with plausible links to democratization,[14] as well as the independent variables relating directly to our theory.

4.2 Independent Variables

Since testing our theory requires data on the full spectrum of successful irregular transitions— those with small and large transitional coalitions, with and without external support—we aggregate data on foreign interventions, coups, and uprisings that successfully yielded new political leaders. Instead of testing these transitions separately, which would still keep them siloed,[15] we combine them into categories based on the size of the underlying transitional coalition and whether or not a foreign power was involved in a meaningful way.

We construct four independent variables: (1) small indigenous coalitions, (2) small foreign-backed coalitions, (3) large indigenous coalitions, and (4) large foreign-backed coalitions. Recall from earlier that purely domestic coups approximate small indigenous coalitions, while small foreign-backed coalitions include both coups with foreign support and interventions that replace individual leaders. Large indigenous coalitions are represented by revolutions and uprisings, whereas large foreign-backed coalitions include outside support for such movements as well as interventions that overhaul a country's institutions.

Data is obtained from several sources. For foreign interventions, we use Downes and Monten's data on foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) (Downes and Monten 2013). They distinguish among FIRCs by autocracies and democracies where the goal is to simply replace a leader; and for democracies, cases involving wholesale institutional reform.[16]

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[14]These are drawn primarily from Colgan (2012); Downes and Monten (2013).

[15]We provide these results in the appendix.

[16]We also run analyses (in the appendix) where we collapse all FIRCs into a single category.

For coups, we obtain data from Powell and Thyne (2011). While their dataset contains both successful and unsuccessful coups, we focus solely on those yielding new political leaders. Because these data do not identify when foreign powers are explicitly involved, we leverage the FIRC data described above to identify coups that had foreign backing, looking for instances where there was both a coup and a leadership FIRC in the same country-year.[17] In all other cases, the coup is assumed to be primarily indigenous in nature.[18]

For uprisings, we leverage two data sources: the Revolutionary Leaders dataset (Colgan 2012) and the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). We utilize these data sets in conjunction to identify leaders that came to power through popular uprisings since the NAVCO data, despite coding for success, do not code whether new leaders ultimately emerged. Specifically, we begin with NAVCO data and we isolate successful uprisings. Then, we utilize Colgan's data to identify new leaders coming to power in the same year as one of these successful campaigns. Finally, to distinguish between indigenous and foreign-backed uprisings, we use NAVCO's own coding of whether a campaign received material support from a foreign state.[19]

Once we establish the universe of irregular regime transitions that successfully yielded new political leaders, we generate lags for each, testing their effects for five, ten, and fifteen years after they occur. These lags continue either until the time period expires (e.g. five years is reached) or until another irregular transition occurs.[20] We do this owing to the likely temporal gap between the onset of an irregular transition and its eventual political effects.

4.3 Controls

Of course, a range of factors unrelated to transitional coalitions and foreign involvement may affect the prospects for democracy. We therefore include a host of control variables in each model. Descriptions and sources for each are available in the appendix

With regard to country characteristics, we include logged population, logged energy consump-

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[17]Cases are listed in the appendix.

[18]As a robustness test, we also analyze different coup data that *does* differentiate between domestic and foreign-sponsored operations. These results, reported in the appendix, are similar.

[19]For the main results we do not distinguish between violent and nonviolent uprisings, though we report these results in the appendix. We find that foreign backing has a greater effect than the method of contention.

[20]In the small number of cases where multiple, successful irregular transitions occur in the same year, both are counted moving forward. We return to this very small subset of cases later.

tion, and level of ethnic fractonalization. Population size and energy consumption are often positively correlated with democracy; greater levels of fractionalization may work against it. We also include dichotomous measures of whether a country is a major oil exporter and if it is a member of the GATT/WTO. Major oil exporters are plausibly less likely to democratize since oil income can reinforce nondemocratic rule. Membership in the GATT/WTO, just as with other consent-based, liberal international organizations, may encourage the diffusion of democratic norms. Finally, we measure the number of coups in a region in a given year, whether there is an ongoing civil or interstate war in that country, and the number of ongoing civil wars bordering a country. In line with existing research, states may be less likely to democratize in times of internal, external, or regional conflict since national security concerns may take precedence (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Goldstone, Bates, Epstein, Gurr, Lustik, Marshall, Ulfelder, and Woodward 2010; Phillips 2015).

There is one additional variable in the Cox proportional hazards models to examine whether autocracies and anocracies transition to democracy. For these models, we add a binary variable that measures whether a country was previously a democracy. Countries with prior democratic experience may have an increased probability of democratizing.

5 Results

Here we present our main findings. Alternative specifications are contained in the appendix, but the same basic conclusions remain the same.

5.1 Irregular Transitions and Polity Scores

We begin by examining the effects of different types of irregular regime transitions on a country's Polity score (Table 3). We estimate the impact of these transitions for the five (Model 1), ten (Model 2), and fifteen years (Model 3) after they occur. Figure 1 plots the magnitude of the main coefficients.

The results largely confirm our theoretical intuitions. Larger coalitions are better for democracy, and outside interference either *exacerbates* the negative effects of small coalitions or *undermines* the positive effects of large coalitions. These findings are similar across time periods. Although the magnitude of a transition's effect is greatest at five years, the general patterns hold at fifteen

Table 3: Prais - Winsten Regression: Change in Polity Score

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.265** (0.119)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.207** (0.092)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.155* (0.081)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.683*** (0.231)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.345* (0.196)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.263** (0.127)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	1.819*** (0.449)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		1.462*** (0.398)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			1.459*** (0.395)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.458 (0.353)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		0.271 (0.236)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.267 (0.196)
Energy Consumption (log)	0.006 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)
Population (log)	0.019 (0.022)	0.017 (0.021)	0.015 (0.021)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.018 (0.069)	-0.025 (0.071)	-0.024 (0.072)
Major Oil Exporter	0.057 (0.060)	0.059 (0.059)	0.065 (0.059)
Interstate War	-0.327** (0.148)	-0.325** (0.146)	-0.330** (0.146)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.119 (0.083)	-0.117 (0.085)	-0.123 (0.085)
Region-Year Coups	0.017 (0.010)	0.018* (0.010)	0.017 (0.010)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.026 (0.027)	0.028 (0.028)	0.028 (0.028)
WTO/GATT Member	-0.051 (0.046)	-0.050 (0.046)	-0.048 (0.047)
Post Cold War	0.254*** (0.066)	0.252*** (0.068)	0.252*** (0.067)
Constant	-0.133 (0.177)	-0.138 (0.173)	-0.143 (0.174)
Observations	5274	5274	5274

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

Region fixed effects incldued in every model but omitted from the table.

*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

years. While this is indicative of an overall weakening in the effect of regime transitions as time progresses, perhaps capturing some uncertainty in political dynamics over time, the consistency of our estimates yields confidence in our interpretation.

Specifically, we find that small transitional coalitions are consistently associated with autocratic backslides. When indigenous, this effect is relatively small: they are associated with decreases of 0.274, 0.219, and 0.170 in a country's Polity score at five, ten, and fifteen years after they occur, respectively. All of these estimates are highly significant (at $p < .05$ for each). Interestingly, foreign support to small coalitions exacerbates their negative effects. At each interval, these transitions are associated with even greater decreases in Polity scores, and all are statistically significant as well. This is in line with our expectation that small indigenous coalitions produce few incentives to support democracy, and those incentives are further reduced with foreign backing, severing the link between a leader and the population.

Figure 1: Coefficient Plot of Change in Polity Scores at 5, 10, and 15 Years

Large coalitions generally have the opposite effect. When indigenous, their effect is sizable, statistically significant, and positive. They make democracy much more likely, yielding democratic gains of 1.244 points at five years, 0.963 points at ten years, and 0.760 points at fifteen years. These represent some of the largest estimates of the entire model, including control variables, and strongly suggest short- and long-term links to democratic gains. When foreign-supported, however, these effects largely disappear with positive coefficient estimates that are statistically insignificant. The new governments produced in such transitions are neither significantly more nor less democratic.

With regard to control variables, we find that only three have any meaningful impact across specifications. First, the dummy indicator of interstate wars consistently generates a negative coefficient, implying that states engaged in interstate conflicts tend to experience decreases in their Polity scores. Second, the number of regional coups in a given year is positively associated with democratic reform, although the coefficient size is quite small and only significant when measuring transitions at ten and fifteen years. In such cases leaders may fear coup contagion, prompting them to preemptively enact democratic reforms. Finally, and consistent with existing research (Marinov and Goemans 2013) the indicator of the post-Cold War era is positive and significant across all models, implying that countries have grown increasingly democratic between 1989 and 2008.

To recap, our examination of changes to a country's Polity scores following irregular regime transitions suggests that the size of the transitional coalition and the presence of foreign involvement

are highly influential. Larger transitional coalitions generally produce leaders that reward their multitude of supporters and consolidate their gains with public goods, proxied here with democratic governance. Conversely, leaders coming to power with the help of small coalitions turn towards private goods to effectively target their most loyal backers. In such cases, less democracy tends to result. When it comes to foreign support, we find that it is typically detrimental. Foreign backing for small coalitions results in an even stronger autocratic slide and undermines the democratic gains made by large coalitions.[21]

These findings are displayed in Figure 2, which plots the marginal effects of irregular transitions at ten years while holding other variables at their means. The positive impacts of large coalitions are clear, as indicated by the increasing slope, as are the negative impacts of small coalitions. It is also clear that foreign involvement pushes both effects further away from democracy, yielding even more autocratic states in the wake of transitions involving small coalitions, and largely unchanged polities in those involving large coalitions.


Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Irregular Transitions at Ten Years (the median interval)

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[21]It is worth noting that F-tests find weak to no statisical difference between the coefficients on domestic and foreign-backed uprisings at five years ($p = .127$), but at fifteen years it is indeed significant ($p = .066$).

5.2 Irregular Transitions and Democratization

We now shift our attention to full democratic transitions. Recall from earlier that this is coded using a binary indicator of whether a non-democracy reaches a Polity score of six or more, whereas the previously analyses examine more discrete changes in that score for the full universe of democratic and non-democratic states. As such, this analysis utilizes a smaller sample since existing democracies are omitted.[22] To analyze the data, we include the same control variables but we now use a Cox proportional hazards model. What we are specifically modeling here is the time until democracy is achieved—if ever—as a function of a country experiencing an irregular regime transition as well as control variables.[23]

Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Nondemocratic to Democratic Transitions

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	0.217 (0.354)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.227 (0.403)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.218 (0.393)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-44.245 (.)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.638 (1.240)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-1.018 (1.353)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	3.252*** (0.586)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		3.319*** (0.588)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			3.317*** (0.607)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.720 (0.558)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		0.433 (0.510)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.310 (0.548)
Energy Consumption (log)	0.032 (0.095)	0.012 (0.097)	0.018 (0.097)
Population (log)	0.091 (0.165)	0.106 (0.170)	0.089 (0.174)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.006 (0.555)	-0.079 (0.540)	-0.051 (0.540)
Major Oil Exporter	-0.570 (0.581)	-0.531 (0.607)	-0.544 (0.603)
Interstate War	-45.354 (.)	-45.382 (.)	-45.596 (.)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.566 (0.392)	-0.522 (0.384)	-0.529 (0.384)
Region-Year Coups	0.049 (0.065)	0.069 (0.064)	0.063 (0.064)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.076 (0.142)	0.067 (0.147)	0.079 (0.149)
Previously Democracy	0.748 (0.525)	0.798 (0.523)	0.811 (0.522)
WTO/GATT Member	0.596** (0.285)	0.599** (0.291)	0.603** (0.291)
Post Cold War	1.425*** (0.353)	1.413*** (0.371)	1.410*** (0.361)
Observations	3576	3576	3576

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).
Region fixed effects incldued in every model but omitted from the table.
*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

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[22]We also have fewer irregular transitions under examination, so the estimates are less stable.

[23]Survival models generally yield results similar to logistic regressions when the data is structured longtitudinally. This is true here, and we report the logistic regression results in the appendix.

Figure 3: Cumulative hazard plot, odds of democratization.

The main findings, presented in Table 4, are generally consistent across intervals. At five, ten, and fifteen years after they occur, only one type of transition has a statistically significant effect on the odds of a non-democracy achieving democracy: large, indigenous transitional coalitions. This effect is highly significant and positive, making democracy over 20 times more likely compared to cases where no irregular transition occurs at all. When foreign powers support these transitions, however, their effect is reduced and no longer statistically significant, putting the likelihood of democratic roughly on par with no transition occurring.

Small transitional coalitions have almost no meaningful effect regardless of whether they are indigenous or foreign-backed. In other words, in the years after a new leader comes to power through a coup or foreign intervention to replace a leader (absent institutional reform), the odds of democracy are roughly the same as if no irregular transition occurred whatsoever. It is not altogether surprising that these estimates yield insignificant coefficient estimates. The odds of full democratization in any single year is already low. Even still, while not statistically significant, these effects are in the expected direction (negative). To illustrate, Figure 3 plots the likelihood of democratization over a ten-year period while holding other variables at their means. The likelihood (at ten year) after a large, indigenous uprising is just over 40%, while it is less than 5% for countries experiencing no transition at all.

Overall, these findings suggest that our theory is not limited to minor democratic gains but

extends to full democratic consolidation as well. That is, when irregular regime transitions are instigated by large transitional coalitions free from foreign influence, they are especially likely to both advance and potentially even achieve democracy. On the other hand, foreign interference and small coalitions are much more likely to result in democratic backsliding, and the odds of achieving full democracy are incredibly slim.

5.3 Alternative Measures of Public Goods

If our theory of transitional coalitions is correct, leaders coming to power on the backs of large coalitions should reward supporters with public, non-targeted goods that benefit their diverse set of constituents. Smaller transitional coalitions should generate private goods. We test this argument using levels of public goods provision other than democracy: civil liberties (Model 1), political liberties (Model 2), civil society participation (Model 3), freedom of expression (Model 4), and equal protection under the law (Model 5). We use Prais-Winsten regression with similar specifications to previous models. For the sake of space, we present results focused on the effect of irregular transitions ten years after they occur.[24]

The results are displayed in Table 5 and they largely confirm our expectations. In the ten years after small indigenous or foreign-backed coalitions, the provision of public goods are generally lower (50% of findings) if not unchanged (the other 50%). Small foreign-backed coalitions generate a negative and statistically significant effect in two of the five models; small indigenous coalitions yield negative point estimates in three of the models. Conversely, large coalitions apparently result in many more public goods than just democracy, but only when they are indigenous. These transitions generate large, positive, and statistically-significant point estimates in every model. As expected, foreign backing ultimately negates those gains (with most coefficients estimates being statistically insignificant).

These findings lend even further support to the notion that the size of transitional coalitions and the presence or absence of foreign support shapes public goods provisions following irregular regime transitions. To reward broad coalitions, leaders not only turn to democracy but are more likely to provide benefits in the form of civil and political liberties, freedom of expression, equality under the law, and consultation with civil society organizations. The opposite is true for small

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[24]We report full results in the appendix; they are highly similar.

Table 5: Prais-Winsten Regressions: Evaluating Alternative Public Goods

	(1) Civ. Liberties	(2) Pol. Liberties	(3) Civ. Society Partic.	(4) Free Expr.	(5) Eq. under Law
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years	-0.024	-0.032*	-0.031**	-0.030	-0.017
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Small Indigenous, 10 Years	-0.018**	-0.034***	-0.009	-0.030**	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years	-0.002	-0.004	0.004	0.002	0.034
	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Large Indigenous, 10 Years	0.062**	0.089**	0.111***	0.083**	0.038**
	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.017)
Energy Consumption (log)	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Population (log)	0.013	0.020	0.029**	0.025	0.017*
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.009)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.093	0.131*	0.062	0.091*	0.036
	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Major Oil Exporter	0.004	0.006	-0.003	0.007	-0.009
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Interstate War	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.023***	-0.019**	-0.008	-0.015**	-0.015***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.004*	0.007**	0.005**	0.006**	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
WTO/GATT Member	0.009**	0.012***	0.011**	0.007	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Post Cold War	0.012***	0.017***	0.014**	0.018***	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Constant	0.493***	0.411***	0.269**	0.342**	0.288***
	(0.116)	(0.151)	(0.124)	(0.155)	(0.103)
Observations	5046	5046	5090	5090	4948

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).
* $p<.1$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p<.01$

transitional coalitions and any coalition backed by foreign actors.

5.4   Contemporaneous Transitions

The majority of successful coups, uprisings, and FIRCs occur in years in which they are the sole irregular transition facing a state. In our data set there are 209 coups and 36 uprisings that produced new leaders. Of these, however, eight occur in the same year.[25]

The dynamics of these cases are more complicated than when coups or uprisings transpire on their own (Casper and Tyson 2014). Generally speaking, we expect that the same types of pressures will remain. Specifically, leaders who come to power as a result of a coup (a small coalition) but who face the pressures of widespread discontent associated with a simultaneous uprising (a large coalition) should be reluctant about prioritizing private goods to a small subset of supporters. This is due to the latent threat from discontented citizens who may have contributed

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[25]Guatemala in 1954, Bolivia in 1952, Chile in 1973, Mali in 1991, Rwanda in 1994, Sudan in 1985, Yemen in 1967, and Afghanistan in 1978.

to the ouster of the old regime. The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan in 2019 is illustrative. While demonstrators were protesting the regime in large numbers, the military launched a coup to remove Bashir. Demonstrations continued after declarations that the new military regime was implementing a three-month state of emergency and would lead a two-year transitional government. Under pressure, a tentative agreement was reached wherein a joint military and civilian government would lead for three years until competitive elections could be held (Associated Press 2019). At the same time, we expect the democratizing potential of contemporaneous transitions may be squandered when a foreign power is involved.


Figure 4: Coefficient plot, evaluating the effect of simultaneous uprisings and coups with and without foreign influence.

To evaluate how these cases unfold, we return to our data and create a separate category of irregular transitions: those where two distinct transitional coalitions were concurrently activated, with one being small (coups) and the other large (uprisings).[26] We also distinguish between concurrent transitions that had foreign backing, and those that did not. The full results are available in the appendix, but we present coefficient plots of the main independent variables in Figure 4. The results are consistent with our expectations. Mixed-coalitions without foreign support are associated with democratic gains ($p <$.000). Alternatively, when a foreign power is involved, mixed coalitions are associated with democratic retreat.

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[26]We code these as one, and re-code them as zero elsewhere.

These findings may partially explain why some scholars have found that coups can promote democratization under certain circumstances. For example, Thyne and Powell (2016, 197) argue that "[a]fter ousting illegitimate regimes, we expect many coup leaders to begin building political legitimacy as quickly as possible. Doing otherwise places the coup-led government in peril of being overthrown themselves, especially given the cyclical nature of coups." One example they point to is a coup in Mali in 1991. While it is true that there was a political opening afterwards, a large part of the impetus for this were concurrent uprisings. Our theory suggests that these protests may have been integral in this process.[27]

6   Conclusions

This article develops a unified framework to understand the impact of irregular regime transitions on democratization. We argue that the size of transitional coalitions—those groups responsible for bringing new leaders to power—and the presence or absence of foreign support influence whether newly-minted leaders will prioritize public or private goods in the years following their ascent. The smaller the coalition, the greater the incentive to target supporters with private goods. When a coalition is large, public goods like democracy, civil liberties, and political freedoms are more efficient and therefore more likely to emerge. Foreign actors complicate these dynamics. Their influence tends to erode democratic gains, intentionally or otherwise. A series of quantitative tests analyzing governance trends in the five, ten, and fifteen years after irregular regime transitions confirm these expectations.

These findings have important ramifications. From an academic perspective, our framework ties together a disparate set of works on various forms of irregular regime transitions. In so doing, we are able to test these transitions in relation to one another rather than on their own. This allows us to speak directly to the comparative effect of coups, for instance, in relation to uprisings, which is impossible under siloed research designs. And, by isolating common threads running throughout these transitions, our findings advance what we know about how regimes evolve over time. This framework also sheds light on the pressures facing national leaders and how their political calculations are fundamentally shaped by the dynamics propelling them to power. As our

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[27]See https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-03-27-mn-944-story.html.

results show, these revolutionary dynamics have enduring consequences that will continue to shape polities long after they apparently end.

From a policy perspective, our findings have implications for how states can support aspiring democracies. On the one hand, states may wish to use their leverage to compel national leaders to broaden their political coalitions. Transitions that solely succeed through military might or insider deals are unlikely to benefit the masses. Rather, the will of the people should be respected and support. Of course, we also find that overt state intervention typically hurts the prospects for democratic consolidation. Unless states are willing to embrace wholesale regime transformation and to commit the necessary resources and time, their efforts may be better spent on less visible involvement. Consequently, it may be more effective to support democracy through US AID and the State Department than the CIA or the Pentagon. By providing training, developmental assistance, and support for civil society programs, states can potentially empower broad transitional coalitions while limiting the negative externalizes of their overt involvement.

There are several directions for future research. Scholars would be well-served by assessing how different irregular regime transitions impact a host of outcomes other than democratization. Does the size of the transitional coalition affect subsequent levels of economic growth? Does it affect a country's belligerence, including their propensity to get involved in interstate conflicts? More work is also needed on sequencing of revolutionary events and not solely on contemporaneous irregular transitions. For instance, how likely, and how effective, are coups that follow in the wake of mass uprisings—possibly one or even several years after the initial transition? And how are irregular transitions affected by the types of regimes that are presently in place? Perhaps large coalitions are more effective against personalist rather than military-based regimes. Researchers interested in these and other outcomes would be well-served by conducting a unified analysis akin to what was done here.

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7 Appendix

7.1 Variable Description

Table 6: Description and Sources of Control Variables

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	Source
Energy Consumption (log)	6.13	0	14.95	Correlates of War NMC Data
Population (log)	9.04	5.40	14.02	Correlates of War NMC Data
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.41	0	0.99	Downes and Monten (2013)
Major Oil Exporter	0.15	0	1	Political Instability Task Force
Interstate War	0.06	0	1	Downes (2008)
Civil War	0.09	0	1	Correlates of War
Region-Year Coups	5.99	0	23	Political Instability Task Force
Bordering Civil Wars	0.79	0	7	Political Instability Task Force
WTO/GATT Member	.62	0	1	Political Instability Task Force
Previous Democracy	.14	0	1	Downes and Monten (2013)

Variable Definitions:[28]

- *Civil Liberties Index* (v2x_civlib): "To what extent is civil liberty respected?"

- *Political Liberties Index* (v2x_pollib): "To what extent are political liberties respected?"

- *Civil Society Participation Index* (v2x_cspart): "Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?"

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[28]Coppedge et al. (2018).

Table 7: List of Independent Variables.

| Independent Variable	Count	Source
Small Indigenous Coalitions	200	Powell and Thyne
Small Foreign-Backed Coalitions	9	Powell and Thyne
Large Indigenous Coalitions	14	Chenoweth/Colgan
Large Foreign-Backed Coalitions	27	Chenoweth/Colgan

Figure 5: Instances of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, Successful Coups, and Successful Uprisings since 1955.

Table 8: Description of Public Goods Variables

Variable	Mean	Min	Max
Civil Liberties	0.559	0.013	0.927
Political Liberties	0.535	0.011	0.986
Civil Society Participation	0.500	0.019	0.992
Freedom of Expression	0.521	0.013	0.988
Equality under the Law	0.524	0.012	0.990

- *Freedom of Expression Index* (v2x_freexp): "To what extent does government respect press & media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?"

- *Equal Protection Index* (v2xeg_eqprotec): "How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?"

7.2 Details of Irregular Regime Transitions in Nondemocracies

This table demonstrates that there is variation in the types of transitions occurring in nondemocracies.

Table 9: Irregular Transitions in Nondemocracies since 1955

	No. of Events	Full Democ. (15 Years)	Success Rate
Autocratic FIRC	10	2	20.00%
Dem. Leadership FIRC	1	0	00.00%
Dem. Institutional FIRC	6	3	50.00%
Domestic Coup	177	24	13.56%
Foreign-Backed Coup	4	1	25.00%
Popular Uprising	6	3	50.00%
Foreign-Backed Uprising	16	7	43.75%

7.3 Alternative Data on Coups

In this analysis we replicate our initial models using new data on coups. In the main paper, we rely on coup data from Powell and Thyne (2011). While this data does not identify whether a given coup is entirely domestic or if it received foreign support, we leverage FIRC data to make this distinction. This yields 9 cases that appear to be foreign-backed coups:

- Guatemala, 1954
- Chile, 1973
- Cyprus, 1974
- Central African Republic, 1979
- Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960
- Lesotho, 1994
- Comoros, 1989
- Iran, 1953
- Republic of Vietnam, 1963

Since this is imperfect, we run additional tests using data on coups collected by Cline Center for Democracy (2013) which *does* distinguish between foreign and domestic coups. The new results are presented below. They are highly similar to those originally presented. Specifically, high statistical significance remains for every coefficient on both domestic and foreign coups at five, ten and fifteen years; the coefficients themselves are of similar magnitudes and directions; and the point estimates for foreign-backed coups are, as before, always greater than for domestic coups. This gives us confidence in our initial coding scheme, and further confidence in the veracity of our findings as they relate to coups and their impact on democracy.

Table 10: Prais - Winsten Regression: Change in Polity Score

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.192* (0.110)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.131 (0.085)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.088 (0.077)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.601*** (0.230)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.336* (0.171)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.193 (0.124)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	1.290*** (0.484)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		0.990** (0.388)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			0.773* (0.460)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.472 (0.319)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		0.291 (0.211)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.261 (0.173)
Energy Consumption (log)	0.006 (0.011)	0.009 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)
Population (log)	0.015 (0.022)	0.012 (0.021)	0.014 (0.021)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.012 (0.065)	0.013 (0.065)	0.004 (0.067)
Major Oil Exporter	0.054 (0.059)	0.058 (0.058)	0.060 (0.058)
Interstate War	-0.339** (0.153)	-0.365** (0.164)	-0.372** (0.160)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.086 (0.081)	-0.088 (0.084)	-0.096 (0.085)
Region-Year Coups	0.016 (0.010)	0.017* (0.010)	0.017* (0.010)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.035 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.035 (0.028)
WTO/GATT Member	-0.050 (0.047)	-0.056 (0.047)	-0.053 (0.047)
Post Cold War	0.257*** (0.067)	0.258*** (0.068)	0.267*** (0.068)
Constant	-0.117 (0.175)	-0.121 (0.169)	-0.158 (0.169)
Observations	5274	5274	5274

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

Region fixed effects incldued in every model but omitted from the table.

*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

7.4 Replicating Survival Models with Logistic Regressions

Here, we replicate the survival models presented in the main text to ensure that the results—pertaining to full democratization—are not limited to this particular statistical model. With the important exception of the two coup variables, the results are identical when using logistic regression on the same dependent variable with the same controls.

Table 11: Logistic Regression: Nondemocratic to Democratic Transitions

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	0.477 (0.427)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		0.026 (0.450)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			0.095 (0.428)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.000 (.)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.914 (1.441)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-1.309 (1.436)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	3.095*** (0.591)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		3.021*** (0.636)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			3.045*** (0.631)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	1.240** (0.535)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		0.835* (0.498)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.870* (0.455)
Energy Consumption (log)	0.087 (0.102)	0.068 (0.103)	0.075 (0.102)
Population (log)	0.065 (0.166)	0.078 (0.170)	0.076 (0.170)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.016 (0.499)	-0.088 (0.498)	-0.065 (0.497)
Major Oil Exporter	-0.688 (0.657)	-0.653 (0.669)	-0.646 (0.661)
Interstate War	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.496 (0.374)	-0.444 (0.368)	-0.451 (0.362)
Region-Year Coups	0.055 (0.071)	0.072 (0.069)	0.067 (0.070)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.034 (0.157)	0.027 (0.160)	0.022 (0.159)
Previously Democracy	0.667** (0.261)	0.697** (0.280)	0.709** (0.286)
WTO/GATT Member	0.679** (0.301)	0.675** (0.312)	0.656** (0.316)
Post Cold War	1.620*** (0.318)	1.598*** (0.338)	1.587*** (0.334)
Constant	-5.855*** (1.096)	-5.786*** (1.110)	-5.812*** (1.130)
Observations	3440	3501	3501

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

Region fixed effects incldued in every model but omitted from the table.

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

7.5 Assessing the Impact of Violent and Nonviolent Uprisings

In these analyses we assess the impact of how uprisings occur; that is, their method of contention. We re-run the main analyses with Prais-Winsten regressions but instead of disaggregating between foreign-backed and domestic popular uprisings, we now disaggregate between violent and nonviolent uprisings for five, ten, and fifteen years after they occur.

The findings reveal that nonviolent movements have a slightly stronger connection to democratic gains, though the impacts of violent and nonviolent uprisings are themselves not statistically different. While both types of uprisings generate positive coefficients, for nonviolent movements there is weak statistically significance at $p = .069$ and $p = .071$ for five and ten years, respectively. At fifteen years, significance recedes to $p = .108$. The statistical significance for violent uprisings, on its positive coefficients, hovers around $p = .200$. Yet, post-tests reveal that these coefficients are not distinct, with an F-test yielding $p = .623$ at five years. In comparison, the F-test comparing foreign and domestic-backed uprisings at five years is $p = .127$; at fifteen years it is $p = .076$. This implies that our initial distinction between foreign backing or not is more meaningful when it comes to democratic gains.

Table 12: Prais - Winsten Regression: Assessing Violent and Nonviolent Uprisings

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Nonviolent Uprising, past 5	0.761* (0.414)		
Nonviolent Uprising, past 10		0.258 (0.331)	
Nonviolent Uprising, past 15			0.267 (0.305)
Violent Uprising, past 5	0.496 (0.308)		
Violent Uprising, past 10		0.096 (0.220)	
Violent Uprising, past 15			0.108 (0.186)
Dem. Institutional FIRC, past 5	2.690*** (0.187)		
Dem. Institutional FIRC, past 10		1.776*** (0.189)	
Dem. Institutional FIRC, past 15			1.464*** (0.255)
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.251** (0.120)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.213** (0.092)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.164** (0.083)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.686*** (0.236)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.322* (0.189)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.240* (0.124)
Energy Consumption (log)	0.004 (0.011)	0.006 (0.010)	0.007 (0.010)
Population (log)	0.022 (0.022)	0.017 (0.022)	0.016 (0.022)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.015 (0.066)	0.002 (0.067)	0.001 (0.070)
Major Oil Exporter	0.046 (0.059)	0.054 (0.061)	0.053 (0.061)
Interstate War	-0.357** (0.159)	-0.364** (0.167)	-0.370** (0.164)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.092 (0.082)	-0.089 (0.085)	-0.092 (0.085)
Region-Year Coups	0.020** (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.019* (0.011)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.030 (0.027)	0.036 (0.028)	0.036 (0.028)
WTO/GATT Member	-0.052 (0.047)	-0.046 (0.047)	-0.047 (0.047)
Post Cold War	0.247*** (0.065)	0.239*** (0.067)	0.251*** (0.067)
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		0.821* (0.418)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			0.609 (0.474)
Constant	-0.202 (0.172)	-0.157 (0.176)	-0.161 (0.177)
Observations	5274	5274	5274

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

Region fixed effects incldued in every model but omitted from the table.

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

7.6 Re-Estimating the Results for Particular Regimes Types

Here, we examine whether our results hold across different types of regimes. The goal is to assess whether our results are being driven by irregular transitions in, for instance, partly-democratic countries, making them ungeneralizable to others. We therefore replicate the full models presented in the main text while limiting our analysis to different Polity score ranges: first, full autocracies (Polity scores of -8, -9, and -10), anocracies (Polity scores from -7 to 7), and full democracies (8, 9, 10).[29] As before, we examine the effects of irregular transitions for five, ten, and fifteen years after they occur. Of course, countries can move across these thresholds. To allow for movement, we measure these cutoff Polity scores at five, ten, and fifteen year lags. Below, we report coefficient plots from these analyses since our main focus is the primary explanatory variables (i.e. types of irregular transitions).

Unsurprisingly, the results are somewhat different for fully autocratic regimes. These are very specific types of countries, often with highly entrenched leaders. There are also fewer number of observations; only 1,026 compared to 2,639 for anocracies and 1,229 for democracies. Overall, we find that few irregular transitions are capable of ushering in meaningful democratic advancements even within 15 years. Perhaps regime changes in these countries take longer, or require successive attempts/interventions to take hold. Yet, we do find that democratic institutional FIRCs can be effective in the long run—being associated with significant democratic gains at fifteen years out— whereas autocratic-led FIRCs, democratic-led leadership FIRCs, and foreign-backed coups result in greater autocracy. These three interventions are all associated with foreign actors, which supports our theoretical intuition.

The results for anocracies mostly mirror our original results. These countries have a mix of democratic and autocratic traits, they are not fully consolidated in either direction, and as such they are perhaps most fungible. Consequently, we find that popular uprisings can precipitate democratic gains, although the gains are erased when foreign actors are involved. Domestic coups bring down Polity scores, and that effect is amplified with foreign backing. And democratic institutional FIRCs are correlated with major democratic advancements.

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[29]In the main text, we use 6 or higher on the Polity score to indicate a transition to democracy. The use of 8 as a cutoff here reflects our interest in separating fully consolidated democracies at the top of the scale from regimes below it.

Figure 6: Analysis restricted to autocratices.

Finally, and not surprisingly, the results are different when we only examine fully democratic regimes with Polity scores of eight, nine, and ten. Coups, especially those with foreign backing, are linked to democratic reversal, but otherwise irregular transitions have little effect. To be sure, not every type of transition is well-represented here: there are significantly fewer uprisings and foreign-backed coups which makes estimation difficult (if not impossible). Taken together, the general pattern of our results hold across Polity ranges. They are most consistent with anocracies that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic.

Figure 7: Analysis restricted to anocracies.

Figure 8: Analysis restricted to democracies.

7.7 Assessing Alternative Public Goods at Different Intervals

In the main text we report changes public goods within ten years of different irregular transitions. Here, we present results for five, ten, and fifteen years after transitions. The results are largely consistent across intervals.

Table 13: Prais-Winsten Regressions: Civil Liberties

	(1) Model 1, 5 Years	(2) Model 2, 10 Years	(3) Model 3, 15 Years
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.020*** (0.007)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.018** (0.008)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.020** (0.009)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.040** (0.019)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.024 (0.017)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.030 (0.018)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	0.054** (0.021)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		0.062** (0.024)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			0.061** (0.025)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.008 (0.028)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.002 (0.036)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.000 (0.039)
Energy Consumption (log)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.014 (0.012)	0.013 (0.012)	0.013 (0.012)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.092 (0.069)	0.093 (0.069)	0.093 (0.069)
Major Oil Exporter	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
Interstate War	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.007)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
WTO/GATT Member	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Post Cold War	0.011*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)
Constant	0.488*** (0.116)	0.493*** (0.116)	0.493*** (0.116)
Observations	5046	5046	5046

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

*p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

7.8 Assessing the Size of Popular Uprisings

Our theory suggests that the more individuals involved in a transitional coalition, the more likely public goods (and democracy) will be. This is difficult to test directly since it is unclear how to measure, for instance, the coalition involved in a coup. Yet, we can more plausibly estimate the coalition size when it comes to uprisings by drawing on the number of participants coded in the

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Table 14: Prais-Winsten Regressions: Political Liberties

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.036*** (0.010)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.034*** (0.012)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.036*** (0.013)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.055** (0.023)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.032* (0.019)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.035* (0.018)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	0.077** (0.039)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		0.089** (0.043)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			0.087* (0.046)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.015 (0.037)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.004 (0.046)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.003 (0.049)
Energy Consumption (log)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Population (log)	0.020 (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.130* (0.078)	0.131* (0.078)	0.131* (0.078)
Major Oil Exporter	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)
Interstate War	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.008* (0.005)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
WTO/GATT Member	0.012*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)
Post Cold War	0.017*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.017*** (0.006)
Constant	0.404*** (0.150)	0.411*** (0.151)	0.409*** (0.151)
Observations	5046	5046	5046

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 15: Prais-Winsten Regressions: Civil Society Participation

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.015* (0.008)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.009 (0.010)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.009 (0.010)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.033* (0.017)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.031** (0.015)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.021* (0.012)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	0.098*** (0.037)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		0.111*** (0.041)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			0.115*** (0.042)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.014 (0.027)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		0.004 (0.034)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.010 (0.035)
Energy Consumption (log)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.030** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)	0.029** (0.013)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.059 (0.045)	0.062 (0.045)	0.062 (0.045)
Major Oil Exporter	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Interstate War	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
WTO/GATT Member	0.012** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)
Post Cold War	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)
Constant	0.260** (0.124)	0.269** (0.124)	0.268** (0.123)
Observations	5090	5090	5090

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

* $p<.1$, ** $p<.05$, *** $p<.01$

Table 16: Prais-Winsten Regressions: Freedom of Expression

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.033*** (0.010)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		-0.030** (0.012)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.031** (0.013)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.056** (0.027)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.030 (0.021)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.032 (0.021)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	0.073** (0.031)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		0.083** (0.035)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			0.082** (0.036)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.022 (0.038)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		0.002 (0.049)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.013 (0.051)
Energy Consumption (log)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Population (log)	0.026 (0.017)	0.025 (0.017)	0.026 (0.017)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.090* (0.052)	0.091* (0.052)	0.091* (0.052)
Major Oil Exporter	0.008 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)
Interstate War	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)
WTO/GATT Member	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)
Post Cold War	0.017*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.018*** (0.006)
Constant	0.336** (0.155)	0.342** (0.155)	0.341** (0.155)
Observations	5090	5090	5090

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 17: Prais-Winsten Regressions: Equal Protection under the Law

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Small Indigenous, 5 Years	-0.000 (0.005)		
Small Indigenous, 10 Years		0.000 (0.006)	
Small Indigenous, 15 Years			-0.001 (0.007)
Small Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	-0.023 (0.017)		
Small Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		-0.017 (0.014)	
Small Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			-0.016 (0.012)
Large Indigenous, 5 Years	0.032** (0.015)		
Large Indigenous, 10 Years		0.038** (0.017)	
Large Indigenous, 15 Years			0.038** (0.018)
Large Foreign-Backed, 5 Years	0.030 (0.025)		
Large Foreign-Backed, 10 Years		0.034 (0.032)	
Large Foreign-Backed, 15 Years			0.035 (0.033)
Energy Consumption (log)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.018* (0.009)	0.017* (0.009)	0.017* (0.009)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.035 (0.051)	0.036 (0.051)	0.036 (0.051)
Major Oil Exporter	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.008)
Interstate War	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Ongoing Civil War	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)
No. Bordering Civil Wars	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
WTO/GATT Member	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Post Cold War	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Constant	0.284*** (0.103)	0.288*** (0.103)	0.291*** (0.102)
Observations	4948	4948	4948

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country).

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

NAVCO data.

The coefficient plot in Table 9 shows the effect of increasing the number of participants involved in an uprising, regardless of foreign involvement or method of contention (e.g. violence or nonviolence). These estimates were derived using the fully-specified models that control for other forms of irregular transition. As this figure demonstrates, the more people that are involved in installing a new leader, the more democratic the state becomes in the subsequent 5, 10, and 15 years. This strongly supports our argument.


Figure 9: Estimated using full model specification.